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PRACTICAL SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND
THE INDIAN TRIBAL ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND SELFDETERMINATION ACT ♦
by
Judith V. Royster ∗
This Article addresses the latest attempt by Congress to promote tribal selfdetermination through a statute designed to increase tribal control over
energy resource development on Indian lands. The author begins with a brief
history of the gradual transfer of control over tribal resources from the federal
government to tribes. This shift in government policy has culminated in the
recent passage of the Indian Tribal Energy Development and SelfDetermination Act (ITEDSA), which allows some resource development
without federal approval. ITEDSA allows tribes to enter into tribal energy
resource agreements (TERAs) which give the tribes final decision-making
power over their energy-related resources. The author notes that the increased
sovereignty conferred by TERAs comes with several trade-offs. TERAs
increase the risks of resource development while reducing some of the
government’s trust responsibilities. TERAs shift some of the cost of resource
development from the government to the tribes and provide for more public
scrutiny of tribal affairs. The author ultimately concludes that the benefits of
ITEDSA will outweigh the costs for certain tribes.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the primary means of economic development for many
1
Indian tribes is development of the reservation’s natural resources. Prior
to the growth of the gaming industry in the 1990s, in fact, resource
development was likely the major source of tribal economic
2
development, and it remains so today for a substantial number of tribes.
3
The tribal mineral resource base is extensive. Nearly two million
acres of Indian lands are subject to mineral leases administered by the
1

See Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian Economic
Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597, 634 (2004) (noting that long-term leasing is “an
important revenue stream for many tribes, particularly those rich in natural
resources”); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances
for Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO?
STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 2, 9
(Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992) (positing that “[a]s natural resource
endowments rise, so do the chances of success” in economic development).
2
See, e.g., Tribal Energy Self-Sufficiency Act and the Native American Energy Development
and Self-Determination Act: Hearing on S. 424 and S. 522 Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 108th Cong. 115 (2003) [hereinafter ITEDSA Hearing] (statement of Vernon
Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River Reservation)
(noting that “the production of oil and gas reserves on the Wind River Reservation is
the primary source of revenue for the Tribes”); Indian Energy Development: Regaining
Self-Determination Over Reservation Resources: Oversight Hearing before S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess. 15 (2008) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (testimony of
Chairman Carl Venne, Crow Nation) (stating that “most of our governmental
revenue is derived from our 35-year relationship with Westmoreland Resources,
Inc.”).
3
In addition to the mineral resources noted in the text, more than 43 million
acres of tribal lands are range and grazing land, and another 2.5 million acres are
“crop areas.” Forest Service National Resource Guide to American Indian and Alaska
Native Relations, App. D: Indian Nations (1997), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/
people/tribal/tribexd.pdf. Some 16–18 million acres, located on well over 200 Indian
reservations in about half the states, are forest lands. INTERTRIBAL TIMBER COUNCIL,
INDIAN FOREST MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM, AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN FORESTS AND
FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1993), available at
http://cnie.org/nae/docs/assessment.html#top [hereafter IFMAT Report] reports
16 million acres of forested land on 214 reservations in twenty-three states. Fiscal
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4

Department of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs estimates
that approximately 15 million additional acres of energy resources lie
5
undeveloped. The direct economic impact of the resource base is
likewise substantial. In fiscal year 2007, the Department of the Interior
distributed more than $465.5 million in royalties and other mineral
6
revenues. Production of energy resources on Indian lands represents
more than ten percent of the total of federal on-shore energy
7
production.
Despite the extent and economic importance of the mineral
resources, however, tribal control over the development and use of tribal
natural resources has historically been limited. In the last few decades,
Indian tribes have gained a far greater role in decision-making
concerning the use of their mineral resources. In part, this increased role
results from tribes asserting a greater say in what occurs within their
territories (practical sovereignty), and in part from new federal laws that
place more of the decision-making power in tribal hands (political
sovereignty).
Using mineral development as an example, this Article briefly traces
the historic trajectory of federal laws: comprehensive federal control and
exploitation during the allotment period; a slight loosening of federal
control, tribal consent, and concern with tribal revenue streams in the
reorganization period; and new approaches focusing more on tribal
participation, partnerships, and increased control during the modern era
of self-determination. Most recently, Congress has begun to enact a next
generation of resource development statutes that authorize tribes, subject
report, U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal
Year 2005, at 10, www.doi.gov/bia/BIA_PAR_2005_FINAL_02232006_web.pdf reports
nearly 18 million acres of forested land on 275 reservations in twenty-six states.
4
U.S. Minerals Management Service, Total Producing and Non-Producing
Leases by Category, Fiscal Year 2007, http://www.mrm.mms.gov/MRMWebStats/
Home.aspx (follow “Lease Data” hyperlink; then follow “Total by Category”
hyperlink).
5
ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 93 (statement of Theresa Rosier, Counselor to
the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior). The
department estimates that the undeveloped lands “contain over 5 billion barrels of
oil, 37 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 53 billion tons of coal that are technically
recoverable with current technologies.” Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 47
(statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and
Economic Development, Department of the Interior). In addition, the department
identifies “118 reservations with a high potential for biomass production,” tribes with
geothermal resources and opportunities for solar development, and approximately
23 million acres on seventy-seven reservations “with class three or higher wind
potential.” Id.
6
U.S. Minerals Management Service, American Indian Reported Royalty
Revenues, Fiscal Year 2007, http://www.mrm.mms.gov/MRMWebStats/Home.aspx
(follow “Reported Royalties Revenue” hyperlink; then follow “American Indian
Reported Royalty Revenues” hyperlink).
7
ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 93–94 (statement of Theresa Rosier).
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to Department of the Interior-approved general regulations, to enter into
specific development agreements without federal approval. The most
recent and wide-ranging of these next generation statutes is the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act (ITEDSA) of
2005. This Article examines the approach taken by ITEDSA, and then
critiques the statute in light of its stated purpose of promoting tribal selfdetermination.
II. POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY, PRACTICAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND
TRIBAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development
has spent more than a decade and a half identifying the key factors in
successful tribal economic development. Although by no means the sole
factor, sovereignty has emerged as one of the crucial attributes of viable
economic development. Sovereignty, in turn, has two aspects as identified
by Harvard Project researchers Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt:
“practical” and “political.” Political sovereignty, a part of the externalities
of economic development, is largely “the extent to which a tribe has
genuine control over reservation decision-making, the use of reservation
8
resources, and relations with the outside world.” Federal Indian policy,
the researchers contend, is “[t]he central determinant of political
9
sovereignty. The more that federal policy promotes true tribal control
over decision-making and resource use, the more likely development is to
10
be successful.”
More important than political sovereignty, however, is what Cornell
and Kalt refer to as “practical sovereignty,” that is: putting “practical
11
decision-making power in the hands of Indian nations.” The concept of
practical sovereignty builds upon political sovereignty, but moves beyond
law and policy to actual on-the-ground governance. Practical sovereignty
“puts the development agenda in Indian hands” and “marries decisions
12
and their consequences, leading to better decisions.” Tribes exercising
actual decision-making powers “consistently out-perform outside
13
decision-makers.” So central is practical sovereignty to successful
economic development that Cornell and Kalt state categorically that:

8

Cornell & Kalt, Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 8.
Id. at 13.
10
Id. at 8.
11
Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to Economic Development
on American Indian Reservations: One Works, the Other Doesn’t, (Joint Occasional
Papers on Native Affairs, No. 2005-02, 2006), at 12, available at http://www.jopna.net/
pubs/Jopna_2005-02_Approaches.pdf.
12
Id. at 13.
13
Miriam Jorgensen & Jonathan B. Taylor, What Determines Tribal Economic
Success? Evidence from Tribal and Individual Indian Enterprises, (Harvard Project
on American Indian Economic Development, PRS 00 -3, 2000), at 3, available at
9
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After fifteen years of research and work in Indian Country, we
cannot find a single case of sustained economic development in
which an entity other than the Indian nation is making the major
decisions about development strategy, resource use, or internal
organization. In short, practical sovereignty appears to be a necessary
(but not sufficient) condition for reservation economic
development. 14
15

Thus, practical sovereignty “does not guarantee success,” but
success without it is rare to nonexistent.
Practical sovereignty, no less than political sovereignty, requires
reducing the role of the federal government. Federal decision-making is
16
“the default mode” of reservation economic development, but also the
17
approach that does not work. Indeed, Cornell and Kalt identify federal
control over economic decision-making as “the core problem in the
standard approach to development and a primary hindrance to
18
reservation prosperity.” In order to further successful tribal economic
development, then, the federal government must make the difficult
transition from decision-maker to advisor, from controlling the process to
providing information and technical assistance and serving as a resource
19
for tribes.
The history of tribal mineral development laws and practice
demonstrates a trend toward increasing political and practical
sovereignty. With the advent of the push for tribal self-determination in
the 1970s, tribes asserted the right to a more significant say—greater
practical sovereignty—in the development of their resources. Congress,
in turn, has enacted resource statutes that increased tribal political
sovereignty over resource decisions and decreased the control of the
federal government.
One of the earliest and most far-reaching of Congress’s efforts was
Public Law 93-638, the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1974. 20 Under P.L. 638, tribes may enter into contracts
and self-governance compacts to assume administration of federal Indian
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hpaied/pubs/documents/WhatDeterminesIndianEcon
omicSuccess.pdf.
14
Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 11, at 14.
15
Cornell & Kalt, Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 15.
16
Id. at 35.
17
See generally Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 11.
18
Id. at 18.
19
Cornell & Kalt, Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 15; Cornell & Kalt, Two
Approaches, supra note 11, at 18. See also Raymond Cross, De-Federalizing American
Indian Commerce: Toward a New Political Economy for Indian Country, 16 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 445, 485 (1993) (arguing that “[s]uccessful tribal governments” should be
able to manage their own resources and property, allowing the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to “become a true service bureau” rather than the primary manager of tribal
resources).
20
88 Stat. 2203–17 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.).
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21

programs, and may use the 638 program to gain significant control over
natural resources development. For example, a statistical analysis of
seventy-five forestry tribes showed that in the 1980s, forty-nine of the
tribes used the 638 program to take some degree of management over
22
their forest resources. The study concluded that “tribal control of
forestry under PL 638 results in significantly better timber management.”
When tribes took complete management over their forest resources
under 638, output rose as much as forty percent with no increase in the
number of workers, and the tribes received prices as much as six percent
higher than they had when the forest resources were managed by the
23
Bureau of Indian Affairs. Despite this type of success, the 638 program
has been criticized as a half-measure. Although it pushes tribes away from
24
the federal control model, and authorizes tribes to administer federal
programs, it “does not give tribes a major role in determining what the
programs look like or whether the policies that drive those programs are
25
appropriate.” Tribal control of federal programs is thus better than
federal control, but a clear second-best to tribal choices of what programs
and development opportunities to pursue.
The surest way for tribes to control natural resources development,
26
of course, is to develop the resources as a tribal enterprise. But while
27
some tribes do engage directly in mineral production, as well as other

21

See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 22.02 (LexisNexis 2005)
(1941).
22
Matthew B. Krepps, Can Tribes Manage Their Own Resources? The 638 Program
and American Indian Forestry, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO?, supra note 1, at 179, 182. The
National Indian Forest Resources Management Act of 1990 specifically preserves and
authorizes the use of contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with tribes for the
management of forest resources. See 25 U.S.C. § 3104(a) (2000). The American
Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act, enacted the same year, similarly
authorizes tribes to use 638 contracts or self-governance compacts to develop and
implement agricultural resource management plans. 25 U.S.C. § 3711(b)(1) (2000).
23
Krepps, supra note 22, at 183.
24
Cornell & Kalt, Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 36.
25
Cornell & Kalt, Two Approaches, supra note 11, at 9. See also George S. Esber,
Jr., Shortcomings of the Indian Self-Determination Policy, in STATE AND RESERVATION: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 212, 221 (George Pierre Castile & Robert L.
Bee eds., 1992) (“The Indian Self Determination Act is not a self-determination
policy but an invitation to participate.”).
26
Despite tribal control when tribes are the developers, the Harvard Project
notes that “both inside and outside Indian Country, it is difficult to make government
ownership of business work,” citing problems with motivating top management and
“separation of politics from day-to-day business management.” Cornell & Kalt,
Reloading the Dice, supra note 1, at 36–37.
27
For example, the Colorado River Indian Tribes’ sand and gravel operation
produces materials for highway and construction projects. See Colorado River Indian
Tribes, Business Opportunities, http://critonline.com/crit_contents/business. The
Southern Ute Tribe has an oil and gas operating company that produces natural gas
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28

resource development activities, most large-scale mineral development
is still the province of non-Indian companies that enter into leases or
other agreements with Indian tribes. The remainder of this Article will
therefore concentrate on the federal mineral development statutes and
the tribes’ exercise of political and practical sovereignty over those
resources.
III. THE TRAJECTORY OF TRIBAL SAY IN MINERAL DEVELOPMENT

The three major natural resources traditionally subject to leasing are
agricultural and grazing lands, forests, and minerals. Each has been
subject to federal statutes that follow a similar arc—comprehensive
federal control and exploitation during the allotment period; a slight
loosening of federal control, tribal consent, and concern with tribal
revenue streams in the reorganization period; and new approaches
focusing more on tribal participation, partnerships, and increased
29
control during the modern era of self-determination. This Section will
focus on the trajectory of federal laws promoting mineral development
on Indian lands.
A. The Federal Government as Decision Maker
1. The Allotment Era Jumble
Widespread leasing of minerals, like leasing of other resources,
30
began in the allotment era under the rubric that Indian lands should

from hundreds of on-reservation wells. Thomas H. Shipps, Tribal Energy Resource
Agreements: A Step Toward Self-Determination, NAT. RES. & ENVT., Summer 2007, at 55, 56.
28
Tribes operate tribal farms, keep tribal herds, and manage tribal forest
industries. As examples, at least half a dozen Arizona tribes engage in large-scale
farming, see Tribal Farms are a Growing Part of Arizona Agricultural Economy, NEWS FROM
INDIAN COUNTRY, Aug. 2007, available at http://indiancountrynews.net/index.
php?option’com_content&task’view&id’1197&Itemid’84; the Colorado River Indian
Tribes’ CRIT Farms alone manages over 15,000 acres of croplands. See Colorado River
Indian Tribes, supra note 27. The InterTribal Bison Cooperative has 57 member
tribes in 19 states; collectively, the tribes manage herds totaling over 15,000 buffalo.
See InterTribal Bison Cooperative, Who We Are, www.itbcbison.com/about.php;
Douglas H. Chadwick, Where the Buffalo Now Roam, DEFENDERS, Fall 2006, available at
www.defenders.org/newsroom/defenders_magazine/fall_2006. Menominee Tribal
Enterprises, the business arm of the Menominee Tribe in Wisconsin, manages the
forest resources of the reservation for timber production and reforestation, including
operation of the tribe’s sawmill. See Sustainable Development Institute, Menominee
Forest, www.sustainabledevelopmentinstitute.org/ SustainingtheForest/Menominee
TribalEnterprises.asp.
29
For a more detailed look at the history of resource development statutes, see
COHEN, supra note 21, at § 17; Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country:
The Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541 (1994).
30
The allotment era of federal Indian law and policy ran from approximately
1871 to 1934. See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1

1072

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:4

be made productive. The first general authorization for leasing of Indian
lands was an 1891 statute authorizing tribal councils to issue grazing and
31
mining leases. Mineral leasing was expanded in a series of acts in the
1910s and 1920s. Some of these later statutes required tribal consent;
32
some did not. All of them expanded the term of mineral leases from
33
the 1891 ten-year maximum, although not in a consistent manner. And
34
all of them authorized state taxation on production.
The allotment years were thus a period during which the federal
government first authorized, and then expanded, the availability of
Indian mineral resources for development by non-Indians. After a
cautious beginning in 1891, statute after statute opened more lands and
more resources. The statutes were a jumble of requirements, however.
Lease durations were not uniform; tribal consent was not always required;
and state taxation was often permitted. Regardless of the specifics,
however, the federal government was entirely in charge—of what
resources could be developed, for what length of time, and under what
circumstances. In most cases, tribes could consent to non-Indian
development, but had little control otherwise over the management and
development of their natural resources.
2. The Reorganization Era Consolidation
35
With the onset of the reorganization era, Congress responded to
problems with allotment era leasing statutes and practices. The Indian
(1995). In addition to the statutes discussed in the text, timber sales on Indian forest
lands were also first authorized during this era, in 1910. 25 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
31
25 U.S.C. § 397 (2000). The act authorized leases on reservation lands “bought
and paid for” that were not needed for agricultural purposes or allotments. The U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted “bought and paid for” to mean lands set aside by treaty or
agreement, but not by executive order. See British-American Oil Prod. Co. v. Bd. of
Equalization, 299 U.S. 159, 164 (1936). The act required secretarial consent and
limited leases to five years for grazing and ten years for mining. Agricultural leases for
five-year terms were first authorized on the same basis in 1894, 25 U.S.C. § 402
(2000), with the term extended to ten years for irrigable lands in 1926. 25 U.S.C.
§ 402a.
32
Tribal consent was not required by the act of 1919, amended in 1926,
authorizing leases in nine western states for minerals other than oil and gas. 25 U.S.C.
§ 399 (2000). Oil and gas leasing statutes in 1924 and 1927 did require tribal consent.
25 U.S.C. §§ 398–398a (2000).
33
The act of 1919, amended in 1926, authorized twenty year leases for resources
other than oil and gas. 25 U.S.C. § 399. The acts of 1924 and 1927 lengthened the oil
and gas lease term to ten years and “as much longer as oil or gas shall be found in
paying quantities.” 25 U.S.C. §§ 398–398a.
34
25 U.S.C. §§ 398–399. The oil and gas leasing statutes of 1924 and 1927 further
directed that the state production taxes could be levied against Indian royalties. 25
U.S.C. §§ 398, 398c.
35
The reorganization era of federal Indian law and policy was ushered in
formally by the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 985, codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 464–479. Reorganization repudiated the allotment and
assimilation approach of the previous decades, and focused on the revitalization of
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Reorganization Act itself addressed general leasing authority, while a
separate reorganization era statute made major changes in the way
mineral leasing was conducted. Although these statutes attempted to
correct prior abuses and provide a measure of authority to Indian tribes,
federal management and control remained the norm for resource
development.
The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), the cornerstone
legislation of the reorganization era, authorized Indian tribes to form
IRA constitutional governments and receive federal charters of
36
incorporation. For those tribes that elected the IRA, IRA constitutions
included a provision that tribal consent was required for the lease or
37
encumbrance of tribal lands, and tribal business councils operating
under IRA charters of incorporation were authorized to manage tribal
property, including the authority to enter into leases of up to ten years
38
without secretarial approval.
Mining was not specifically mentioned in the IRA, but in 1938
39
Congress enacted the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA), intended in
40
part to help achieve the IRA goal of revitalizing tribal governments. The
IMLA substituted a single set of mineral leasing procedures for the
allotment era jumble. All new mineral leases of tribal lands required both
tribal consent and secretarial approval, and all new leases would issue for
a term of ten years and “as long thereafter as minerals are produced in
41
paying quantities.” To ensure that tribes received “the greatest return”
42
on their minerals, regulations established a system of payments with
43
minimum rates for rents and royalties. The IMLA was silent on state
taxation, but the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently interpreted it as
disallowing the practice of deducting state taxes from Indian royalty
44
payments.
The reorganization era was thus a time of consolidating and
streamlining federal mineral leasing statutes. In keeping with the federal
tribal governments. See generally GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN
INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 1934–
1945 (1980).
36
See COHEN, supra note 21, at § 1.05.
37
25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000).
38
Id. § 477; see also 25 C.F.R. § 84.004(b),(f)(2008). The term was extended from
ten years to 25 years in 1990. Act of May 24, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-301, § 3(c)(3), 104
Stat. 206 (1990).
39
25 U.S.C. §§ 396a–396g (2000).
40
S. REP. NO. 75-985, at 2–3; H.R. REP. NO. 75-1872, at 1–3.
41
25 U.S.C. § 396a.
42
S. REP. NO. 75-985, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 75-1872, at 2.
43
25 C.F.R. §§ 211.20, 211.41–211.43 (2008).
44
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 768 (1985). A few years later,
however, the Court held that neither the IMLA nor general principles of Indian law
preemption prevented states from taxing non-Indian mineral producers directly.
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176–87 (1989).
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policy focus on the revitalization of tribal governments, tribal consent was
uniformly required for resource development, and Congress paid more
attention to tribal revenues from mining activities. Nonetheless, tribes
had more authority over resource development on paper than in
45
practice. IRA corporations could enter freely into leases, but the tenyear maximum lease term curtailed any real utility for mineral
development. Leasing was the sole route for mineral development by
non-Indians, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) set standard lease
terms and developed standard lease forms. Mineral leases were essentially
perpetual once minerals were produced in paying quantities, preventing
tribes from renegotiating more favorable terms as conditions changed.
Royalty rates were low, and industry often nominated tracts for sale,
reducing the tribal role to simple consent. And federal surveys of Indian
lands were generally lacking, leaving tribes with little real information
46
about their natural resources before entering into leases. In the
reorganization era, therefore, political sovereignty was minimal and the
federal government retained most of the practical decision-making about
Indian natural resources development and use.
B. Increasing Practical and Political Sovereignty: The IMDA

The 1970s ushered in a new federal Indian policy, one of tribal self47
determination. In this era, Congress enacted new measures for mining
on tribal lands, providing for greater tribal participation in resource use
and development. The legislative push under the self-determination
policy began in earnest in the mid-1970s. The Indian Financing Act of
1974 called for tribes to “fully exercise responsibility for the utilization
48
The Indian Selfand management of their own resources.”
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 called for “a
meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly
transition from the Federal domination of programs for, and services to,
Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in
the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and
49
services.” Viewed through this new lens of tribal self-determination and
50
management of resources, the resource statutes of the reorganization
years were woefully out of sync.
45

Because “salvaging Indian economies” was a priority in the reorganization era,
BIA officials believed that “that task required the continuation of maximum
administrative control over Indian resources.” TAYLOR, supra note 35, at 93.
46
See MARJANE AMBLER, BREAKING THE IRON BONDS: INDIAN CONTROL OF ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT 56 (1990).
47
See generally COHEN, supra note 21, at § 1.07.
48
25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000).
49
25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (2000).
50
See Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983). As a means to
reduce tribal dependence on federal funding, President Reagan pledged that his
administration would “assist tribes in strengthening their governments by removing
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Agitation for change struck in the mining arena. Not only did the
new policy of self-determination highlight the essentially passive role
assigned to tribes under the 1938 IMLA, but the energy boom of the
51
1970s left tribes with an ever smaller fraction of their resources’ value.
Western energy tribes, at least those not already bound to long-term
leases under the IMLA or earlier statutes, tried several strategies. One was
a moratorium on new mineral development called by several tribes while
52
they engaged in careful planning for development. A second was
formation of the Council of Energy Resources Tribes as a means of
providing energy tribes with information, advice, and technical
53
assistance. A third was the negotiation of mineral development
agreements with energy companies. Relying on statutory authority to
54
enter into service contracts “relative to their lands,” several tribes
bypassed the restrictive provisions of the IMLA and entered into
negotiated agreements that provided more tribal decision-making
55
authority and greater tribal profits. The Secretary of the Interior
initially approved several of these agreements, but determined in 1980
that the department did not have the authority to approve an oil and gas
56
agreement. The result was to call into question the legitimacy of the
existing approved agreements. But energy tribes had begun to exercise
practical sovereignty over their mineral resources, and there was no
going back.
Congress responded with an exercise of political sovereignty: the
57
Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA) of 1982. The IMDA’s goals
were “first, to further the policy of self-determination and second, to
maximize the financial return tribes can expect for their valuable mineral
58
resources.” Under the IMDA, all tribes were authorized to enter into
minerals agreements of any kind, including “any joint venture, operating,
59
production sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement . . . .”
the Federal impediments to tribal self-government and tribal resource development.”
Id. at 97. He further stated that “Tribal governments have the responsibility to
determine the extent and the methods of developing the tribe’s natural resources.”
Id. at 98.
51
For example, many coal leases set a flat royalty rate of 17.5 cents per ton.
When the price of coal increased by 237 percent from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the
average royalty per ton increased by only thirty-five percent. AMBLER, supra note 46, at
66.
52
Id. at 62, 72.
53
Id. at 91–117.
54
25 U.S.C. § 81 (2000).
55
Royster, supra note 29, at 583–84.
56
AMBLER, supra note 46, at 87.
57
25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2000). The IMDA directed the Secretary to review
agreements approved in the 1970s, and take any steps necessary to bring them into
compliance with the IMDA. Id. § 2104(a).
58
S. REP. NO. 97-472, at 2 (1982).
59
25 U.S.C. § 2102(a).
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Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, a tribe could
choose what degree of control it wished to exercise, and what degree of
61
risk it was willing to take, by its method of structuring an agreement.
Moreover, the statute obligated the Secretary, upon the request of the
tribe and “to the extent of his available resources,” to provide advice,
assistance, and information to tribes during the minerals agreements
62
negotiations. The IMDA was thus a significant leap: not only were tribes
authorized for the first time to directly negotiate the terms of their
mineral development, but they were also authorized to move beyond
leases into any type of arrangement they found beneficial.
The exercise of practical sovereignty under the IMDA, however, had
certain drawbacks for tribes. A depressed energy market in the 1980s, a
lack of information and expertise with which to negotiate, and the
potential financial risk sometimes made IMLA leases more attractive to
63
tribes than the uncertainties of IMDA agreements. Nonetheless, IMDA
64
agreements appear to have been early and widely adopted.
The IMDA, like the self-determination era statutes for resource
65
development generally, represented a substantial increase in political
sovereignty. Congress opened up options for tribes that wished to take
advantage of them, and took important preliminary steps toward the
Secretary’s transition from decision-maker to advisor. The political
sovereignty instituted by a change in federal Indian policy was
accompanied by the practical sovereignty of tribes choosing to take
advantage of the new statutory opportunities.
Little, if any, research appears to exist on whether these practical
exercises of sovereignty are working well for the tribes that choose them,
but there are indicators. The 1980s study of tribes that chose to take
control of forest management under the 638 program concluded that
tribes provided significantly better management, resulting in higher

60

Id.
Royster, supra note 29, at 586–87.
62
25 U.S.C. § 2106.
63
The IMDA preserved tribes’ ability to use the 1938 IMLA if they chose, as well
as the leasing rights of IRA tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 2105 (2000).
64
AMBLER, supra note 46, at 241–43.
65
Congress did not address increased tribal authority over farming, range, and
forest resources until 1990. When it did, Congress took a somewhat different
approach than it had to mineral resources, focusing on tribal resource and
management plans and the development of tribal law, as well as federally-approved
sales and leases. In 1990, Congress enacted both the American Indian Agricultural
Resource Management Act (AIARMA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3745 (2000), and the
National Indian Forest Resources Management Act (NIFRMA), id. §§ 3101–3120.
Both statutes call for increased tribal participation in management of the resources;
state that the Secretary’s participation in management should be consistent not only
with federal trust responsibilities, but also with tribal objectives; and provide training
and education opportunities for tribal members.
61
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66

output and increased prices. As to minerals specifically, there has been
only a single reported court case under the 1982 IMDA, and that was
67
resolved in 1986. It is certainly possible, indeed likely, that the lack of
litigation concerning IMDA minerals agreements means that the IMDA is
working well as a form of both political and practical sovereignty for
68
tribes.
C. The Next Generation Approach To Resource Development

Despite the substantial practical sovereignty embodied in the IMDA,
that statute, like all the leasing acts that preceded it, required the
cumbersome process of secretarial approval of each specific lease or
69
agreement. Secretarial approval of development instruments traces
back to the Nonintercourse Act, first enacted by the first Congress in
1790, and unchanged since 1834. The Nonintercourse Act provides that
no lease or other encumbrance of Indian land is valid under United
70
States law without the consent of the federal government. In 1871, at
the onset of the allotment period of federal Indian policy, Congress
provided that any contract or agreement with an Indian tribe for the
provision of services “relative to their lands” must be approved by the
71
Secretary of the Interior, and it incorporated the approval requirement
72
into subsequent mineral development statutes as well.

66
Krepps, supra note 22, at 183. See the discussion supra at text accompanying
notes 22–23.
67
Quantum Exploration, Inc. v. Clark, 780 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986). Quantum
Exploration sought to bind the Blackfeet Indian Tribe to a minerals agreement,
arguing that the tribe did not have the right to rescind the agreement prior to the
Secretary’s approval, and that the BIA should not have provided the tribe with advice
about problems with the agreement. The court easily rejected both arguments,
concluding that both the tribe and the federal government were acting well within
the IMDA.
68
See David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from
Itself? Tribal Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
173, 191 (2004) (noting that “[t]he many unremarkably normal events are left
unreported.”).
69
See, e.g., Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 8 (written testimony of Chairman
Marcus D. Well, Jr., for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation)
(noting that secretarial approval of the tribe’s IMDA agreements took “over three
years”); id. at 18 (testimony of Chairman Carl Venne, Crow Nation) (noting “an
extremely slow BIA approval process”).
70
25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
71
Id. § 81. An amendment in 2000 removed the phrase “relative to their lands,”
and provided instead that any “agreement or contract with an Indian tribe that
encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or more years” requires secretarial
approval. See Act of Mar. 14, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-179, § 2, 114 Stat. 46 (2000).
72
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 396a (2000) (Indian Mineral Leasing Act); 25 U.S.C.
§ 2102(a) (2000) (Indian Mineral Development Act).
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Since 1934, Congress has occasionally granted exceptions to the
Nonintercourse Act requirement of federal approval for every instrument
encumbering of Indian lands. As already noted, tribal corporations
chartered under § 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act may be
empowered to “manage, operate, and dispose of property,” although
73
their leasing authority is time-limited. Originally, IRA corporations were
authorized to issue leases for up to ten-year terms, but in 1990 Congress
74
extended that authority to twenty-five years. Similarly, in 2000 Congress
amended the 1871 general statute addressing contracts and agreements
with Indian tribes to provide that agreements and contracts that
encumber Indian lands for a period of less than seven years do not
75
require secretarial approval.
Although these provisions place significant independent decisionmaking with tribes, the short-term leasing authority has not been overly
useful for the economic development of tribal mineral resources. First, it
appears that less than a third of all federally recognized tribes has a
76
federal corporate charter. Most tribes, therefore, are likely unable to
take advantage of the IRA provision for leasing without secretarial
approval. Moreover, non-Indian companies entering into mineral leases
or agreements are unlikely to accept terms that extend for only seven to
77
ten years. Even though both the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938
78
and the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 preserve the leasing
79
rights of IRA corporations, the IRA is little used for mining purposes.
By the time a mining company engages in exploration and development
activities, production will often just reach economic feasibility in ten

73

25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000).
Pub. L. No. 101-301, § 3(c), 104 Stat. 207 (1990).
75
25 U.S.C. § 81(b); see also 25 C.F.R. § 84.003 (2008). The legislative history of
the amendment notes that § 81 was “concerned primarily with federal control” over
agreements between tribes and non-Indians, but that “[o]ver the decades many
provisions of this law have come to be antiquated and unnecessary.” H.R. REP. NO.
106-501, reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 69.
76
In 2007, there were 561 federally recognized tribes. See Indian Entities
Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 72 Fed. Reg. 13,648 (Mar. 22, 2007). At least 157 Indian tribes, including
sixty-six in Alaska, have corporate charters, although the information at the website
visited seems limited largely to those charters issued in the 1930s and 1940s. See Univ.
of Okla. Law Ctr., Indian Reorganization Act Era Constitutions and Charters,
http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA.html.
77
25 U.S.C. § 396b.
78
The IMDA, 25 U.S.C. § 2105, provides that leasing rights under the IMLA
remain unaffected, and the IMLA preserves the right of IRA tribes to lease under
their corporate charters. 25 U.S.C § 396b.
79
See To Permit Indian Tribes to Enter into Certain Agreements for the Disposition of
Tribal Mineral Resources: Hearings on S. 1894 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 62–63 (1982) (statement of Joe McKay, Member, Blackfeet Tribe
of Montana).
74
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80

years’ time. The 1990 extension of IRA corporate leasing to twenty-five
year terms might have resulted in greater use of IRA leases, but by the
time that extension was enacted, many tribes with mineral resources had
moved away from leases to the more flexible arrangements authorized by
the 1982 IMDA.
Early in the self-determination era, Congress began to experiment
cautiously with a new approach, one that eliminated secretarial approval
of specific leases if the leases were issued in accordance with Interiorapproved tribal regulations. In each instance, the legislative history
declares that the new approach is intended to further tribal
independence in development decisions.
In 1970, Congress amended the general surface leasing statute,
81
known as § 415, to authorize the Tulalip Tribes to issue surface leases
that do not involve “the exploitation of any natural resource” for up to
fifteen years, or for certain longer periods if the lease is executed under
82
tribal regulations approved by the Secretary. Specific leases that comply
with these requirements do not require secretarial approval. The
Department of the Interior, in support of the legislation, noted that the
tribes wished to remove federal restrictions that they viewed as “an
83
impediment to tribal progress.”
Thirty years later, Congress again amended 25 U.S.C. § 415 to
84
provide a broader authorization to the Navajo Nation. In 2000, at the
85
urging of the tribe, Congress authorized the Navajo Nation to issue
business and agricultural leases for up to twenty-five years and other
surface leases for up to seventy-five years if the lease is executed under
86
tribal regulations approved by the Secretary. The Secretary is directed
80
See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432, 1433–34 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (noting that the company spent nearly six years in exploration and related
activities before submitting a mining plan). In recognition of this, the standard
Indian mineral lease term is ten years and as long thereafter as the minerals are
produced in paying quantities.
81
25 U.S.C. § 415 (2000). Surface leases under § 415 may include “the
development or utilization of natural resources in connection with operations under
such leases.” Id. § 415(a).
82
25 U.S.C. § 415(b). Subsection (b) was created by Act of June 2, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-274, § 3, 84 Stat. 301, 302 (1970), and amended by Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 122,
100 Stat. 1783 (1986).
83
S. REP. No. 91-773, at 3239 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3237. The
legislative history reveals, however, that the federal government was concerned with
far more than supporting tribal decision-making. Congress noted that the tribal lands
were “strategically located” close to downtown Seattle, and suited for “high-quality
residential, industrial, and recreational purposes.” Id. at 3237–38.
84
The Navajo Nation is not an IRA tribe; it has neither an IRA constitution nor
an IRA corporate charter. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195, 198
(1985).
85
See Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 317, 361 (2006).
86
25 U.S.C. § 415(e).
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to approve tribal regulations if the regulations are consistent with
Interior regulations for surface leasing and “provide for an
87
environmental review process.” As with the Tulalip provision, specific
leases that comply with the special statutory requirements do not require
secretarial approval. Congress specified, however, that the authorization
did not extend to any lease for “the exploration, development, or
88
extraction of any mineral resources.” In enacting the statute, Congress
expressly found that one purpose was to “revitalize” the Navajo Nation
“by promoting political self-determination, and encouraging economic
89
self-sufficiency.”
In 2005, Congress expanded the new approach dramatically,
reaching well beyond specific tribes. As part of the massive Energy Policy
Act, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self90
Determination Act (ITEDSA), which has the potential to fundamentally
change the way that tribal resource development occurs.
D. The Next Generation Mineral Statute: ITEDSA

ITEDSA authorizes Indian tribes, at their option, to enter into tribal
energy resource agreements (TERAs) with the Department of the
91
Interior. The Secretary is mandated to approve a TERA if the proposed
agreement complies with a slew of statutory requirements, foremost
among which is that the tribe demonstrate “sufficient capacity to regulate
92
the development” of the tribal resources. Once a tribe has an approved
93
TERA, it is authorized to enter into leases and business agreements for
energy resource development, and to grant rights of way for pipelines
and electric transmission and distribution lines, without the approval of

87

Id. § 415(e)(3).
Id. § 415(e)(1).
89
Omnibus Indian Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 106-568, § 1202(b)(3), 114
Stat. 2868, 2934 (2000).
90
25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3506 (2000).
91
Id. § 3504(e). This option became available on April 9, 2008, when the final
federal regulations took effect. See Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 12808
(March 10, 2008).
92
ITEDSA § 3504(e)(2)(B)–(D). The regulations require a tribe to demonstrate
its capacity by describing its “ability to negotiate and enter into” development
instruments, discussing the tribe’s costs and sources of revenue associated with those
responsibilities, and describing any 638 contracts or environmental programs that the
tribe has assumed under federal laws. 25 C.F.R. § 224.53(f) (2008).
93
Business agreements are broadly defined to include “[a]ny permit, contract,
joint venture, option, or other agreement that furthers any activity related to locating,
producing, transporting, or marketing energy resources on tribal land,” as well as
amendments, supplements, and modifications to such agreements, and “[a]ny other
business agreement entered into to or subject to administration under a TERA.” 25
C.F.R. § 224.30 (2008).
88
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94

the Secretary. With the exception of oil and gas leases, which may be
made for the standard term of ten years and as long thereafter as the oil
or gas is produced in paying quantities, leases, business agreements, and
95
rights of way may be made for terms not to exceed thirty years. Thus,
unlike the IMDA and its predecessor mineral leasing statutes, all of which
require secretarial approval for each lease or minerals agreement that a
tribe enters into, ITEDSA abolishes the need for secretarial approval of
the specific development instrument.
The exercise of tribal self-governance under ITEDSA is still some
96
time away. The final regulations went into effect on April 9, 2008. Any
97
tribe that wishes to may then begin the TERA process. The first step is a
pre-application consultation between the tribe and the Director of the
98
Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development. Following that
consultation, the tribe submits its application for a TERA, including the
99
text of its proposed TERA. The Director determines if the application is
complete and, if so, holds an application consultation meeting, intended
to help the Director determine whether the tribe has the requisite energy
100
resource development capacity. The tribe may then submit a final
101
Once the final proposed TERA is
proposed TERA for approval.
received, the Secretary publishes notice in the Federal Register and
102
requests public comment, and conducts a review under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to determine potential environmental
103
impacts that might arise from the TERA. Ultimately, the Secretary has
270 days from submission of a final proposed TERA to approve it or not,
and “shall” approve it if the TERA meets the statutory requirements and
104
the tribe has demonstrated sufficient capacity. Even if the process
105
moves smoothly and as swiftly as possible, it will easily be a year or more
from the pre-application consultation to an approved TERA.
94

ITEDSA §§ 3504(a)–(b).
ITEDSA § 3504(a)(2)(B), (b)(2). Leases, agreements, and rights-of-way may be
renewed at the discretion of the tribe. ITEDSA § 3504(c).
96
See 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,808.
97
By May 1, 2008, “[s]everal tribes” had already expressed interest in pursuing a
TERA, and the Department of the Interior had convened a national meeting with
interested tribes on April 29. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 45 (statement of
Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and Economic
Development, Department of the Interior).
98
25 C.F.R. § 224.51 (2008).
99
25 C.F.R. § 224.53 (2008).
100
25 C.F.R. §§ 224.57–59 (2008).
101
25 C.F.R. § 224.61 (2008).
102
25 C.F.R. §§ 224.67–68 (2008).
103
25 C.F.R. § 224.70 (2008). The public comment period under NEPA will run
concurrently with the public comment period on the TERA.
104
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2); 25 C.F.R. § 224.71 (2008).
105
The likelihood of a smooth and swift process is, of course, small. In the 2003
hearing on ITEDSA, the Navajo Nation noted that, with respect to its special leasing
95
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IV. CRITIQUES OF ITEDSA

ITEDSA, as the most far-reaching of the next generation of
development statutes, represents a significant step beyond the selfdetermination era statutes of the 1980s and 1990s, toward increased
political sovereignty and greater practical sovereignty. There is no
question that ITEDSA opens new options for tribes, reduces the day-today management role of the federal government, and places greater
practical decision-making in the hands of energy tribes. It also
streamlines the resource development process by eliminating the often
time-consuming step of secretarial approval of specific instruments. As
such, it may stand as a model for future resource development statutes.
Nonetheless, ITEDSA has potential down sides and drawbacks, both
small and large. Many of these were noted in the hearing held on earlier
versions of the statute, but not addressed or corrected in the final
enacted version. If ITEDSA represents the model of future resource
development statutes, the concerns raised by ITEDSA may be instructive
of ways to structure future statutes to reduce or eliminate problems.
A. Energy Resources Limitation

The first concern is the limitation on the resources to which ITEDSA
applies. Enacted as an energy development measure as well as a tribal
106
ITEDSA does not apply to all tribal
self-determination measure,
mineral resources. The statute itself contains no definition of energy
resources, but the regulations define them as “both renewable and
nonrenewable energy sources, including, but not limited to, natural gas,
oil, uranium, coal, nuclear, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, and
107
Tribes’ ability to exercise greater practical
hydrologic resources.”
sovereignty over their mineral resources thus does not extend to such
minerals as clay or sand and gravel. This artificial division of tribal
mineral resources into energy and non-energy resources means that
instruments for the development of non-energy minerals must still go
through a secretarial review process even for tribes that enter into
TERAs. Consigning sand and gravel development to a more onerous
process than, say, uranium or coal development makes little sense.
Amending ITEDSA to apply to the full range of mineral resources
provisions under § 415, “it has taken several years to develop the regulations which
have now been adopted by the Navajo Nation but have yet to be approved by the
Secretary.” ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 109 (Navajo Nation Response to
Questions on S. 424 and S. 522).
106
See, e.g., ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 70 (statement of Sen. Daniel K.
Inouye) (noting that the bill was “intended to provide support to tribal governments
in the development of energy resources on Indian lands”); id. at 93 (statement of
Sen. Craig Thomas) (“As Congress continues to develop a comprehensive energy bill,
Indian resources should not be overlooked.”).
107
25 C.F.R. § 224.30 (2008).
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covered by the Indian Mineral Development Act
would not only
harmonize the two statutes, but ensure that tribes could address all their
mineral resources in the same manner.
B. Access to Financial, Technical, and Scientific Resources

A second concern with ITEDSA is the availability of financial
resources and technical and scientific expertise. Few tribes at present
have the in-house geologists, engineers, hydrologists, and other experts,
or the financial wherewithal to hire or train them, to provide the tribe
with accurate and reliable information about its energy resources and the
environmental and financial impacts of resource decisions. Building
sufficient tribal capacity to regulate energy development is not merely a
matter of tribal interest and determination, but first and foremost a need
for “financial and technical resources” to ensure that tribes approach
109
In the
negotiations with energy companies on a level field.
congressional hearing on ITEDSA’s predecessor bills, both tribal and
environmental representatives stressed the need for “symmetry in
110
capacity” between tribes and energy companies.
ITEDSA provides for Department of Interior grants and loans to
Indian tribes and grants and technical assistance to multi-tribal
environmental organizations, and Department of Energy grants and loan
108

The statute defines mineral resources as “oil, gas, uranium, coal, geothermal,
or other energy or nonenergy mineral resources.” 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a). The IMDA
regulations are more detailed: “Minerals includes both metalliferous and nonmetalliferous minerals; all hydrocarbons, including oil and gas, coal and lignite of all
ranks; geothermal resources; and includes but is not limited to, sand, gravel, pumice,
cinders, granite, building stone, limestone, clay, silt, or any other energy or nonenergy mineral.” 25 C.F.R. § 211.3 (2008) (leases) and 25 C.F.R. § 225.3 (2008)
(minerals agreements).
109
ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 125 (statement of A. David Lester, Director,
Council of Energy Resource Tribes); see also Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 42
(statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and
Economic Development, Department of the Interior) (“if a tribe wants to take
advantage of the opportunity to develop Tribal Energy Resource Agreements with the
Department, we must ensure that the tribe has identified resources and land title
information, and the technical and administrative capability to develop those
resources”).
110
ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 125 (statement of A. David Lester, Director,
Council of Energy Resource Tribes); see also id. at 140 (email from Rebecca L.
Adamson, President, First Nations), id. at 152 (statement of Sharon Buccino, Senior
Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council). Another tribal representative
specifically noted the need for adequate resources to support the “lengthy and costly”
environmental review process mandated in TERAs. Id. at 120–21 (statement of
Vernon Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River Indian
Reservation). See also Gavin Clarkson, Wall Street Indians: Information Asymmetry and
Barriers to Tribal Capital Market Access, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV., 943, 946 (2008)
(discussing “information asymmetry” in the context of financial and business
relationships).
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111

guarantee programs. It further provides for Department of Interior
grants to tribes for the development of energy resource inventories or
energy resources, feasibility studies, tribal law and technical
112
infrastructure for environmental protection, and employee training.
Either directly through the use of federal officials, or indirectly by
providing the finances to hire outside experts, the Secretary is directed to
“ensure, to the maximum extent practicable and to the extent of
available resources, that on the request of an Indian tribe, the Indian
tribe shall have available scientific and technical information and
expertise, for use in the regulation, development, and management of
113
energy resources of the Indian tribe on Indian land.”
Whether this mandate is sufficient to address the concerns expressed
during the hearings is problematic. Certainly Congress intended that
federal resources be made available to assist tribes in the technical,
scientific, and management aspects of regulating the development of
their energy resources. And as certainly, the department has been
114
But the “extent of available
providing some significant assistance.
resources” at Interior is nonetheless unlikely to be adequate to meet the
115
needs of all tribes that wish to take advantage of the TERA program.

111
25 U.S.C. § 3502 (2008). For recent descriptions of DOI and DOE financial
and technical support, see Oversight Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Dr. Robert W.
Middleton, Director, Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development,
Department of the Interior and statement of Steven J. Morello, Director, Office of
Indian Energy Policy and Programs, U.S. Department of Energy).
112
25 U.S.C. § 3503(a)–(b). For recent information on DOI support, see Oversight
Hearing, supra note 2 (statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of
Indian Energy and Economic Development, Department of the Interior).
113
25 U.S.C. § 3503(c). The provision is all but identical to one in the Indian
Mineral Development Act. The IMDA provides that upon the request of a tribe and
“to the extent of his available resources,” the Secretary should provide “advice,
assistance, and information” during the negotiation process, either directly or
indirectly through financial assistance. 25 U.S.C. § 2106.
114
For example, the Department of the Interior, Office of Indian Energy and
Economic Development, maintains the Division of Energy and Mineral Development
(DEMD) in Denver. As described by the Chairman of the Crow Tribe, ADEMD is a
group of geotechnical experts that has provided us with professional appraisals of our
mineral assets, including coal, oil, natural gas, wind energy, and limestone. DEMD is
staffed by experienced industry-based professionals who provide sound advice and
counsel on energy and resource development as well as strategic business-decision
making.” Oversight Hearing, supra note 2, at 16 (testimony of Chairman Carl Venne,
Crow Nation); see also id. (statement of Dr. Robert W. Middleton, Director, Office of
Indian Energy and Economic Development, Department of the Interior) (describing
the work of the Office). Chairman Venne stated that the Crow Nation “would not be
in a favorable position to engage in large scale industrial development without
DEMD’s assistance,” and urged Congress to continue its support. Id. at 19.
115
The lack of federal financial resources may have the unintended and
unfortunate consequence of creating a haves-and-have-nots situation among energy
tribes: those with sufficient internal resources being able to take advantage of the
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Moreover, helping to ensure that tribes negotiate on a level field
requires the Secretary to do more than provide assistance as requested
and feasible. It also requires that the Secretary refrain from providing
information to energy companies that is withheld from the tribes. In the
egregious case of Navajo Nation coal leases in the 1980s, the Secretary of
the Interior supplied crucial information to the coal company which he
116
The coal company then used that
did not supply to the tribe.
information in negotiating a new royalty rate on coal leases, a royalty rate
117
that ultimately cost the tribe some $600 million in lost revenues.
118
Despite the overt breach of a common-law trustee’s duties, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the Secretary’s action did not constitute a
breach of trust under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act and its
implementing regulations, and held therefore that the Navajo Nation
119
could not recover for its losses under that statute. So long as the
Secretary’s legal obligations to tribes do not prevent this type of dealing,
tribes cannot be sure that the negotiating field is indeed level.
The remaining concerns about ITEDSA and its approach focus on
the extent to which the federal government still retains control, the
extent to which tribal decision-making is constrained by federal law, or
both.

greater practical sovereignty that a TERA offers, and those without sufficient internal
resources relegated to secretarial approval of every resource decision.
116
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 497 (2003).
117
Id. at 500.
118
See Navajo Nation v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 236 (2000), rev’d, 263 F.3d
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001), rev’d, 527 U.S. 488 (2003) (“The facts of this case show that the
Secretary acted in the best interests of a third party and not in the interests of the
beneficiary to whom he owed a fiduciary duty—a classic violation of common law
fiduciary obligations.”). The Court of Federal Claims nonetheless ruled against the
Navajo Nation on its breach of trust claim, finding that neither federal violations of
“the most fundamental fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and candor,” id. at 227, nor
anything in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act entitled the tribe to money damages on
its royalty claim. Id. at 236, rev’d, 263 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 488
(2003).
119
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 514. The case is on-going. On remand from the
Supreme Court decision, the Navajo Nation asserted that a “network” of other
authorities—including its treaties, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
and the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act, among others—established a
claim for money damages. The Court of Federal Claims ruled against the Nation, but
the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the network of statutes and regulations
“demonstrates that the government exercises comprehensive control over coal
resource planning, coal mining operations, and coal royalty management and
collection.” Navajo Nation v. United States, 501 F.3d 1327, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 2008 WL 2047578 (Oct. 1, 2008).
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C. Public Input Into Tribal Decision-Making

A substantial concern expressed in the legislative history is that
ITEDSA provides multiple points for public input into tribal decisionmaking concerning energy development. First, a proposed TERA is itself
120
subject to public notice and comment, and the Secretary is required to
take public comments into account in the decision whether to approve a
121
TERA. In addition, TERA requirements include that the tribe must
provide for public notice of final approvals of development
122
instruments, and must establish an environmental review process to
identify significant environmental effects and any proposed mitigation
123
measures. As part of the environmental review process, the tribe must
provide an opportunity for public notice and comment, respond to
comments prior to approving an instrument, and provide a process for
124
consultation with the state regarding any off-reservation impacts. And
finally, any “interested party” may, after exhausting tribal remedies,
125
petition the Secretary to review the tribe’s compliance with its TERA.
Many of the public input provisions of ITEDSA, although not
necessarily all, conflict sharply with tribal self-governance. One tribe’s
attorneys summed up the various public input requirements as “a tradeoff that may be unacceptable” to tribes that otherwise would take
advantage of the TERA program:
Essentially, the measures propose the elimination of Secretarial
approval in exchange for the promulgation of tribal regulations
that not only require consultation with State officials, but also
require public notification and comment processes, and, ultimately,
private citizen challenges of approved leases or rights-of-way based
on allegations of non-compliance with tribal regulations.
Traditional notions of tribal sovereignty would protect tribes against
the incursion of State governments or the views of non-members in
the process of tribal decision-making. To ask tribes to forsake such a
fundamental aspect of sovereignty in exchange for the elimination
of Secretarial approval, may simply be too much for most tribes. 126
1. Public Notice and Comment On TERAs
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to publish notice of a
proposed TERA in the Federal Register for public comment and to
conduct a review of the proposed TERA under NEPA, although
regulations state that the public comment period under NEPA will run

120

25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(3) (2000).
25 C.F.R. § 224.68 (2008).
122
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(IX) (2000).
123
Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C).
124
Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(X), (C)(iii).
125
Id. § 3504(e)(7).
126
ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 159 (statement of Maynes, Bradford, Shipps
& Sheffel, LLP, Attorneys for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe).
121
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127

concurrently with the TERA comment period. Tribal representatives
objected to this process, concerned about “subjecting internal tribal
regulations to the public notice and comment process through the
128
federal register.”
It is not entirely clear what role the public comments on proposed
TERAs will play. As noted earlier, the regulations require the Secretary to
take the public comments into account in determining whether to
129
approve a proposed TERA, and indeed public comment would be a
useless exercise otherwise. But ITEDSA also requires the Secretary to
130
approve a proposed TERA if it meets the statutory requirements. In
order to reconcile these provisions, it would seem that public comments,
in order to be considered by the Secretary, must be restricted to whether
131
a proposed TERA meets the statutory requirements.
The statutory requirements for approval of a TERA are multiple, but
can be divided into three broad categories: first, a requirement that a
TERA must include such provisions as setting forth the terms of the
agreement, establishing an environmental review process, describing
132
remedies for breach, and so forth; second, a requirement that a TERA
must provide for periodic monitoring by the Department of the
133
Interior; and third, a requirement that the Secretary determine “that
the Indian tribe has demonstrated that the Indian tribe has sufficient
capacity to regulate the development of energy resources of the Indian
134
Criteria for determining whether a tribe has demonstrated
tribe.”
sufficient capacity include the scope of activities the tribe proposes to
assume, the history of the tribe’s role in energy development, the tribe’s
administrative capacity, its financial ability to obtain technical expertise,
its past performance with contracts, grants, and leases, and “[a]ny other
factors the Secretary finds to be relevant in light of the scope of the
135
proposed TERA.”
127

25 C.F.R. § 224.70.
ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 105 (statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President,
Navajo Nation).
129
25 C.F.R. §§ 224.67–68 (2008). The regulations specifically provide that “[t]he
Secretary will review and consider public comments in deciding whether to approve
or disapprove the final proposed TERA.” § 224.68(a).
130
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B); see also 25 C.F.R. § 224.71.
131
If the Secretary were to take into account public comments that go beyond
the statutory requirements for a TERA, that would introduce extra-statutory factors
into the Secretary’s determination. It would also appear to violate the fundamental
trust duties that the Secretary owes to Indian tribes. Congress has mandated approval
of TERAs that meet certain statutory requirements, and for the Secretary to introduce
such additional factors into the approval process as public comments may raise,
would subordinate the beneficiary’s interests.
132
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii).
133
Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(ii), (e)(2)(D).
134
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(i); see also 25 C.F.R. § 224.71.
135
25 C.F.R. § 224.72 (2008).
128
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This potentially opens up the realm of public comments. Since tribal
capacity is a statutory requirement, and since the Department of the
Interior has given itself the authority to consider any other (relevant)
factors in determining capacity, public comments are arguably
appropriate on virtually any topic relating to tribal energy development.
That, in turn, becomes an issue not only at the point of the Secretary’s
136
decision on a TERA, but during the administrative appeals process and
137
Both the comments and the agency’s
the judicial review process.
response form part of the administrative record if the Secretary’s
138
decision to approve or disapprove a TERA is challenged in court. With
all that, tribal fears of subjecting tribal regulations to public comment
may well be justified.
There are, however, important principles that both the Secretary and
the reviewing court, if any, must take into account. First, ITEDSA
confines the Secretary’s review of a proposed TERA “to activities specified
139
by the provisions of the tribal energy resource agreement.” Moreover,
Congress directed that the Secretary “act in accordance with the trust
responsibility . . .[and] in good faith and in the best interests of the
140
Indian tribes.” The Secretary of the Interior has announced specific
trust principles for the interpretation and implementation of ITEDSA.
Under the ITEDSA regulations:
(a) The Secretary will interpret and implement [the statute
and the regulations] in accordance with the self-determination and
energy development provisions and policies in the Act.
(b) The Secretary will liberally construe [the statute and the
regulations] for the benefit of tribes to implement the Federal
policy of self-determination. The Secretary will construe any
ambiguities in [the statute or the regulations] in favor of the tribe
to implement a TERA as authorized by [the statute and
regulations]. 141

These provisions obligate the Secretary, in considering the approval
of a TERA, to place tribal self-determination at the core of the decision.
Although the Secretary will consider and respond to relevant public
comments on a proposed TERA, the Secretary should do so in light of

136

ITEDSA establishes an administrative review process. See 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.180–
185 (2008).
137
The Secretary’s approval of a TERA is a final agency action that can be
challenged in court. 25 C.F.R. § 224.77 (2008) (stating that a TERA approval is a final
agency action); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (providing that final agency actions are subject
to judicial review).
138
The only entity with the standing to appeal the Secretary’s decision to
disapprove a TERA is the tribe that proposed it. 25 C.F.R. § 224.77.
139
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(3)(2000).
140
Id. § 3504(e)(6)(A).
141
25 C.F.R. § 224.20 (2008).
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the policies and regulations promoting tribal self-determination and
energy development.
A reviewing court should take the same approach. A basic canon of
federal Indian law is that statutes such as ITEDSA “be liberally construed
in favor of the Indians; and all ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of
142
the Indians.” Moreover, as just discussed, Congress was clear in ITEDSA
itself that these principles apply. An equally basic principle of
administrative law, the Chevron doctrine, is that federal reviewing courts
should normally defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
143
ambiguous statutory language. Although there is some disagreement,
the majority of federal courts that have addressed the interplay of the
Indian law canons and the Chevron doctrine have concluded that if the
two interpretive principles conflict, the Indian law canons—liberal
construction in favor of tribal rights—trump the usual deference to
144
agency decision-making. Thus, to the extent that there is ambiguity in
ITEDSA concerning the Secretary’s use of public comments in the
approval of TERAs, those ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the
tribes. An agency interpretation that runs counter to the canons would
violate not only the agency’s own rules, but the clearly expressed wishes
of Congress as well, thus rendering the interpretation unreasonable.
2. Environmental Review of Tribal Decisions
ITEDSA requires that a TERA establish an environmental review
process for tribal development instruments and provide public
145
Some tribal representatives
notification of final tribal approvals.
objected to the environmental review process either on the basis of
inadequate tribal financial resources to carry out environmental reviews,

142

COHEN, supra note 21, at § 2.02[1] (footnote omitted).
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
43 (1984).
144
See COHEN, supra note 21, at § 2.02[3] (collecting cases). The interplay has
been examined in the scholarly literature. See Scott C. Hall, The Indian Law Canons of
Construction v. the Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous Answer to
the Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN. L. REV. 495 (2004) (arguing that because
congressional intent to diminish tribal rights must be clear, statutory ambiguities do
not allow an agency to interpret the statute so as to diminish those rights, and the
Indian law canons must therefore trump Chevron if the agency does so); Alex
Tallchief Skibine, The Chevron Doctrine in Federal Indian Law and the Agencies’ Duty to
Interpret Legislation in Favor of Indians: Did the EPA Reconcile the Two in Interpreting the
“Tribes as States” Section of the Clean Water Act?, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 15 (1998)
(arguing that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous Indian statute should be
found permissible under Chevron only if the agency has applied the Indian canons of
construction in reaching its interpretation).
145
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C), (B)(iii)(IX) (2000). Although a tribe is required
by ITEDSA to provide an environmental review process, including public notice and
comment, it need not as a matter of federal law establish procedures for public input
on non-environmental matters. 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.102–103 (2008).
143
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or on the ground that the federal government should not mandate what
146
tribal governments choose to do.
The structure of a tribal environmental review process under
147
ITEDSA is set out in the statute. The tribal process must provide for
the identification and evaluation of significant environmental effects of
the proposed instrument, identify any mitigation measures and
incorporate those that are appropriate, provide for public notice and
comment as well as tribal response to substantive public comments prior
to tribal approval of the instrument, provide for tribal technical and
administrative capacity to carry out an environmental review, and provide
a tribal environmental oversight process for TERA activities. This
requirement is intended in large part to mirror the provisions of the
148
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA, which requires an
environmental review process for major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, applies to federal
149
approvals of tribal resource development leases and agreements. Once
the Secretary no longer approves each instrument, however, NEPA does
not apply to the tribe’s development decisions.
There is no question that the environmental review process under a
TERA will be costly, and it will undeniably have the potential to delay
150
implementation of tribal resource decisions. Nonetheless, the TERA
provisions for environmental review of specific tribal development

146

ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 120 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman,
Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the Wind River Indian Reservation) (urging
that the federal government should provide tribes the financial support to conduct
environmental reviews), and 155 (statement of Howard D. Richards, Sr., Chairman,
Southern Ute Indian Tribal Council) (arguing that no environmental review is
required for energy development on neighboring private lands, and that “Congress
should resist efforts designed to change tribal decision-making into public decisionmaking.”). Comments from state government and environmental organization
representatives, on the other hand, supported public involvement in the tribal
environmental review process. Id. at 150 (statement of Sharon Buccino, Senior
Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council), and 172 (statement of Bill
Richardson, Governor, State of New Mexico).
147
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C); see also 25 C.F.R. § 224.63(c) (2008).
148
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347
(2000). The Secretary “agrees,” however, that the regulatory provisions for
environmental review, consistent with the statutory language, “go beyond the
requirements of NEPA.” Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,808, 12,814
(Mar. 10, 2008).
149
See Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972); see generally 1 WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN INDIAN COUNTRY §§ 1:14–1:26 (2005).
150
And in that sense, ITEDSA does not streamline the process of energy
development on tribal lands.
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decisions are not necessarily incompatible with practical sovereignty.
First, like NEPA, the environmental review provisions of ITEDSA
152
mandate a process rather than a substantive outcome. Tribes must
identify and evaluate significant environmental effects, identify proposed
mitigation measures, and include appropriate mitigation measures in
153
specific instruments. Nothing in this process contemplates a particular
substantive decision, but rather that decisions are made in light of full
environmental information. The intent, as with NEPA, is that more
information leads to more informed, and therefore “better,” decision
154
making.
Second, public notice and comment on environmental matters has
long been a feature of tribal mineral development decisions, by way of
the NEPA process. Under current mineral development statutes other
than ITEDSA—the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 and the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938—the Secretary must approve each
specific lease or development agreement. The Secretary’s approval, in
turn, constitutes “major federal action,” which triggers the environmental
review process of NEPA if the action significantly affects the quality of the
155
human environment. Virtually all mineral development has significant
156
enough effects to require an environmental impact statement. An
environmental impact statement for tribal mineral development, whether
157
undertaken by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or another federal agency,
158
is subject to public notice and comment in draft form, and the federal
agency is required to consider and respond to substantive comments in
159
preparing the final statement.
There are at least two important differences between public notice
and comment as part of the NEPA process and as part of the TERA
process. Like other aspects of the TERA environmental review process,
151

It is true, however, that these requirements are imposed on tribes by federal
law, and thus do not necessarily represent tribal choices concerning the balance
between resource development and environmental protection.
152
See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
(“NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary
process.”).
153
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C).
154
See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, The Application of the National Environmental Policy Act
to “Development” in Indian Country, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 377, 427 (1991) (noting that
“tribes can use the NEPA process to reach better decisions, at least in the
environmental sense.”).
155
Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972).
156
See National Environmental Policy Act: Implementing Procedures, 61 Fed.
Reg. 67845, 67847 (Dec. 24, 1996) (listing certain mineral development projects as
automatically requiring a full environmental impact statement without the
preliminary screening stage of an environmental assessment).
157
See COHEN, supra note 21, at § 10.08.
158
40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4)(2008).
159
Id. § 1503.4.
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the costs of notice and comment will be borne by the tribe rather than
the Bureau of Indian Affairs or other federal governmental agency. This
cost-shifting places a significant burden on the tribes. On the other hand,
the consideration of and response to comments will be undertaken by
the tribe rather than a federal agency. Although tribes have substantial
160
input at the NEPA comment stage, the consideration of all comments
and the response to them are matters for the federal agency. The shift to
a tribal environmental review process ensures that comments will be
reviewed in light of tribal values, priorities, and decisions, rather than
filtered through a federal lens.
Third, although the environmental review process introduces the
requirement of public comment on the environmental effects of a
proposed instrument, and the requirement that the tribe respond to
relevant and substantive comments before it approves the instrument,
161
this type of public participation can serve important tribal interests.
First, it allows input by tribal citizens; although tribal members have
indirect influence through their voting powers for tribal government
officials, public comment allows more direct participation in tribal
government. In addition, the public comment provision allows
nonmembers who may be affected by the tribe’s decisions an opportunity
to have their say, and to have the tribe respond directly to their
substantive environmental concerns. Not only does that address
legitimate interests of reservation residents and neighbors who have no
direct say in tribal government, but it helps alleviate the often stilllingering perception that tribal governments are not responsive to valid
162
On the other hand, of course, there is little
non-tribal concerns.
question that the public comment process also allows those who oppose
or fear tribal actions generally to make their misgivings part of the
record. Nonetheless, the values of public participation may outweigh the
concerns those types of comments can pose.
In addition, some tribes pursuing a TERA may already have a tribal
environmental review process in place. Tribal environmental policy acts

160

For example, NEPA regulations require a federal agency to request comments
specifically from Indian tribes “when the effects may be on a reservation.” Id.
§ 1503.1(a)(2)(ii).
161
The advantages identified here build on the section “why public participation
and due process matter” in Dean B. Suagee & John P. Lowndes, Due Process and Public
Participation in Tribal Environmental Programs, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5–9 (1999). Suagee
and Lowndes also note that tribes treated as states for purposes of federal
environmental laws may also be subject to various public participation requirements.
See id. at 25–32.
162
See id. at 9(“Public perceptions of tribal governments are probably more
important, pragmatically, than many tribal leaders and tribal attorneys would like to
acknowledge.”).
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163

(TEPAs) have long been advocated, and in 2000 the Tulalip Tribes
164
published a guide for Indian tribes interested in developing TEPAs.
Tribes that have chosen to develop TEPAs generally cite the importance
of “proper and meaningful consideration of environmental, cultural,
165
historical, and ecological factors” before development occurs, and the
need “to protect and preserve” the reservation and “to provide a safe and
166
habitable homeland” for the generations. It is difficult to determine
167
how many tribes have TEPAs currently in place, but of those tribal
TEPAs readily available online, at least some provide either a public
notice and comment process or some method of public participation in
168
the environmental review process. Although those tribes have chosen
to include public participation in the environmental review process, and
tribes entering into TERAs are required by federal law to do so, there is

163

See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee & Patrick A. Parenteau, Fashioning a Comprehensive
Environmental Review Code for Tribal Governments: Institutions and Processes, 21 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 297, 299 (1997).
164
GILLIAN MITTELSTAEDT, DEAN SUAGEE, & LIBBY HALPIN NELSON, PARTICIPATING
IN THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: DEVELOPING A TRIBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE FOR AMERICAN INDIAN AND NATIVE ALASKAN
COMMUNITIES (Tulalip Tribes 2000), available at http://nepa.fhwa.dot.gov/
ReNEPA/ReNEPA.nsf/All+Documents/C3A140A5BC48BC8D852570240073CFA3/$
FILE/TEPA.pdf.
165
JICARILLA APACHE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TRIBAL CODE tit. 14, § 1,
reprinted in Kathleen M. Sloan, Enhancing Cultural Resources Management and
Improving Tribal Involvement in the NEPA Process Through the Development of a
Tribal Environmental Policy Act 273, 277 app. (May 25, 2007) (Ph.D dissertation,
Oregon State University), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1957/6149.
166
Oglala Sioux Tribal Environmental Review Code (2002), available at
http://narf.org/nill/Codes/oglalacode/oglalaenviro.htm.
167
See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 165, at 212 (“While I have found a variety of
environmental codes and ordinances, I have only located two actual copies of
TEPAs.”). Dr. Sloan’s dissertation includes the two TEPAs that she located—for the
Swinomish Tribe in Washington State and the Jicarilla Apache Tribe in New
Mexico—as appendices. At least one other TEPA is available online: the Oglala Sioux
Tribal Environmental Review Code, supra note 166. Others are referenced in
documents, but not available online. See, e.g., Press Release, Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians to Redevelop Hotel (Dec.
1, 2006), available at http://www.aguacaliente.org/GovernmentAffairsPress/tabid/
55/Default.aspx#redevelophotel (noting that the tribe “has filed formal paperwork
under the Tribal Environmental Policy Act”).
168
See, e.g., Swinomish Tribe Environmental Policy Act, §§ 19-01.130–19-01.150,
reprinted in Sloan, supra note 165, at 270–72, App. B (providing for public notice and
comment, public hearings “whenever appropriate,” and “meaningful reference” in
the final review document to opposing views); see also Oglala Sioux Tribal
Environmental Review Code, supra note 166, §§ 106–107 (providing that
environmental review permits be made available for public inspection, and for an
administrative review process for “[a]ny person aggrieved by an Environmental
Review Permit being issued or denied”).
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no indication that such provisions have proven problematic for the tribes
that adopted them.
One further aspect of the environmental review process under
ITEDSA that was troubling to tribal representatives is the requirement
for specific tribal consultation with state governments on off-reservation
169
environmental impacts. State input into tribal decision-making raises
170
the specter of historic interference by states with tribal matters, as well
as the issue of a lack of symmetry. States are not required by federal law
to consult with tribes concerning on-reservation environmental impacts
of state development initiatives, and few states include a government-togovernment tribal consultation requirement as a matter of state
171
environmental review law. In general, tribes are able to participate in
172
state environmental reviews on the same basis as the public generally.
State governments would have a similar right to participate in the public
notice and comment phase of tribal environmental reviews under TERAs.
Although specific government-to-government consultation on crossborder environmental impacts is likely positive for both tribal and state
interests, the asymmetry of requiring consultation only one way is

169

See 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(X).
See, e.g., ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 159 (statement of Maynes, Bradford,
Shipps & Sheffel, LLP, Attorneys for the Southern Ute Tribe). Increasingly, however,
states and tribes are moving toward intergovernmental cooperation in a number of
areas. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State
Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007). One significant difference in the types of
situations chronicled by Professor Fletcher, of course, is the symmetry of the
cooperation; ITEDSA mandates a one-way process. See id. at 74, 82–86.
171
Even those provisions that do exist appear to be limited. See, e.g., S. B. 18, 2004
Leg., 2003–2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004) (requiring city and county governments to consult
with tribes for the protection of traditional tribal cultural places prior to making
specific land use decisions); see also State of California, Governor’s Office of Planning
and Research, Tribal Consultation Guidelines: Supplement to General Plan
Guidelines 12 (Nov. 14, 2005), available at http://www.opr.ca.gov/index.php?a’
planning/publications.html#pubs-T. See also, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 540.530(1)
(d)(A)(2007) (requiring tribal consultation if an in-stream water right would be
injured by a proposed change of use, place of use, or point of diversion); WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.82.080(3) (2004) (requiring “government-to-government consultation with
affected tribes” before setting minimum instream flows). The state of Oregon
requires that all state agencies “make a reasonable effort to cooperate with tribes in
the development and implementation of programs of the state agency that affect
tribes,” OR. REV. STAT. § 182.164(3)(2007). It also provides that nothing in that
requirement “creates a right of action against a state agency or a right of review of an
action of a state agency.” Id. § 182.168.
172
Approximately 15 states have enacted state environmental policy acts (SEPAs)
that require state or local agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their
proposed activities. See Catherine J. LaCroix, SEPAs, Climate Change, and Corporate
Responsibility: The Contribution of Local Government, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV.—n.18
(forthcoming 2008).
170
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173

troublesome. A better approach would allow tribes to choose whether
to include state consultation as a category separate from public
participation, perhaps conditioned on a reciprocal provision in state law.
3. Interested Party Challenges
The third area of concern in public input is the ITEDSA provision
174
for “interested party” challenges to tribal compliance with TERAs. The
federal statute defines an “interested party” as a person or entity that will
sustain or has sustained an adverse environmental impact because the
175
tribe failed to comply with its TERA. Any interested party may, after
exhausting any available tribal remedies, petition the Secretary to review
176
the tribe’s compliance with its TERA. After consultation with the tribe
and opportunity for the tribe to respond, if the Secretary determines that
the tribe is not in compliance, the Secretary may take such action as the
177
Secretary deems to be necessary to ensure compliance. The ability of
interested parties to challenge a tribe’s compliance with its TERA may
prove to inject considerable delay and expense into tribal resource
development. In particular, the potential for nuisance suits by
disgruntled neighbors is certainly present.
Although interested parties are required to exhaust any tribal
remedies available before petitioning the Secretary, the regulations
contain an odd provision that could discourage tribes from providing
such remedies, or at least pose a potential roadblock to tribal remedies.
The regulations provide that a tribe may resolve the party’s claims “with

173

In Russel Barsh’s classic phrase, “Spillovers spill over both ways.” Russel
Lawrence Barsh, Is There Any Indian “Law” Left? A Review of the Supreme Court’s 1982
Term, 59 WASH. L. REV. 863, 875 (1984).
174
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(7); see also 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.100–121 (2008).
175
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(7)(A). Some commenters on the proposed rules
indicated that the definition “unfairly limits the interests of parties that could appeal
actions taken under a TERA.” Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 12808, 12812
(Mar. 10, 2008). Interior declined to amend the regulatory definition because it
tracks the statutory definition, but “recognize[d] the limitation of the definition.” Id.
at 12812; see 25 C.F.R. § 224.30. The Department also noted that “there are other
avenues for appeal of TERA approved actions,” directing readers to the final rules for
appeals of Interior’s decisions. Id. The appeals procedures in turn specify that appeals
may be taken by an adversely affected tribe, an adversely affected third party to a
lease, agreement, or right-of-way entered into pursuant to a TERA, or an “interested
party” under the statutory definition. See 25 C.F.R. § 224.181. The regulations are thus
consistent with congressional intent that public challenges to TERA-approved
instruments are limited to those alleging environmental injury in fact as a result of
tribal non-compliance with the instrument.
176
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(7)(B). Tribes are not required by ITEDSA to provide a
tribal procedure for interested party challenges. See 25 C.F.R. § 224.104. If, however,
the tribe provides a process, it must issue a final written decision within a “reasonable
time” of receiving the interested party’s petition. Id. § 224.106.
177
25 U.S.C. §§ 3504(e)(7)(C)–(D).
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the petitioner’s written consent.” It is likely that this provision applies
to a petition filed with the Secretary of the Interior after exhaustion of
tribal remedies, and not to the interested party’s petition to the tribal
court or administrative body. While that was quite clear in the proposed
regulations, however, it is less clear in the final version.
In the proposed regulations, the provision was placed immediately
after the provision for an interested party to file a petition with the
179
Secretary. The proposed regulation stated that: “If the tribe submits a
proposed resolution and a written statement signed by the petitioner that
shows the petitioner concurs with the tribe’s proposed resolution of the
claim,” the department may accept the resolution and dismiss the
180
petition. It was thus clear that the tribe and the petitioner could submit
a resolution in which they both concurred after a petition was filed with
the Secretary. Although it appears that Interior received no comments on
181
the proposed provision, it reworded the provision and changed its
place in the order of the provisions. The final provision is located
immediately after a provision stating what a petitioner must do before
182
filing a petition with the Secretary. Further, it states that the tribe may
resolve the petitioner’s claims, “with the petitioner’s written consent,”
when the tribe is “responding to a petition filed under tribal laws,
183
regulations or procedures.” The regulations use the term “petition . . .
under those tribal laws, regulations, or procedures” to describe a petition
which is filed with the tribe itself in order to exhaust any available tribal
184
remedies. It thus appears that Interior, acting on its own without
explanation, has created a potentially serious problem.
Read literally, the current provision appears to state that a petitioner
must consent in writing to any resolution offered through the tribal
administrative or judicial process. If the regulation is interpreted in that
manner, however, it would effectively nullify any tribal process. If an
interested party is unsatisfied with the outcome of any tribal process, the
party has the right to file a petition with the Secretary. If an interested
party is satisfied with the outcome of the tribal process, or not sufficiently
unsatisfied to pursue further remedies, then the tribal resolution of the
matter should stand without more. Anything else makes a mockery of the
tribal remedies.

178

25 C.F.R. § 224.108.
See Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 48,626, 48,639 (proposed
Aug. 21, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 224.114).
180
Id. at 48,640.
181
See Tribal Energy Resource Agreements Under the Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,808, 12,817 (March 10,
2008) (showing no response to any commentary on 25 C.F.R. § 224.108).
182
See 25 C.F.R. § 224.107.
183
Id. § 224.108.
184
See id. §§ 224.105(b), 224.106(c).
179
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In order to remain consistent with the purposes of ITEDSA and the
185
Secretary’s rules for carrying out ITEDSA —the promotion of tribal selfgovernment and the economic development of tribal energy resources—
the provision must be interpreted as it was understood from the
proposed rules. The final rules provide that, in responding to a petition
filed with the Secretary, a tribe may “[p]ropose to cure or otherwise
186
and that the Department will investigate the
resolve the claims”
petitioner’s claim only if the tribe fails to respond to the claim, or fails,
187
refuses, or is unable “to cure or otherwise resolve” the claim. Even
though the provision for a petitioner’s written consent to a proposed
tribal resolution of the claim is placed several sections ahead of these
provisions, reading all the provisions together is the only logical choice.
If they are read together, the rules then offer a tribe without its own
process, or a tribe that has proceeded through its tribal process but left
an unsatisfied interested party, an additional opportunity to resolve the
matter. That is, after the interested party has filed a proper petition with
the Secretary, the tribe may propose a resolution. If the interested party
consents to that proposal in writing, and the Director of the Office of
188
Indian Energy and Economic Development concurs, then the matter is
settled. This understanding of the rules not only demonstrates proper
respect for tribal processes, but also offers a further opportunity for
settlement directly between the tribe and the interested party.
D. Trust Responsibility

A final crucial concern with the ITEDSA model is the nature of the
Secretary’s trust responsibility. The statute directly addresses federal trust
obligations. The Secretary is directed to “act in accordance with the trust
responsibility” and to “act in good faith and in the best interests of the
185

The rules expressly require the department to interpret ITEDSA and its
implementing regulations “in accordance with the self-determination and energy
development provisions and policies in the Act” and “liberally construe” the statute
and regulations “for the benefit of tribes to implement the Federal policy of selfdetermination.” Id. § 224.20.
186
Id. § 224.114(d).
187
Id. § 224.115.
188
The rules provide that Interior must investigate a petitioner’s claim unless
“[t]he tribe has failed, refused, or was unable to cure or otherwise resolve each claim
made in the petition within a reasonable period, as determined by the Director.” Id.
§ 224.115(b). Although it is unclear from the plain language what “as determined by
the Director” modifies, Interior reads the phrase as applying to the tribe’s proposed
resolution of the claim. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,816. The proposed rule on the same
subject provided expressly that the Director should investigate if A[t]he Director did
not accept the tribe’s proposed resolution in which the petitioner agreed.” 71 Fed.
Reg. at 48,640. One commenter objected that the Director should not be able to
reject solutions mutually agreed upon by the tribe and the interested party, but
Interior responded that it believed its trust responsibility required it to maintain
oversight of negotiated resolutions. 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,816.
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Indian tribes.” Nothing in ITEDSA “shall absolve the United States
190
from any responsibility to Indians or Indian tribes.” The Secretary is
obligated to protect the interests of tribes in case any other party to a
specific instrument violates the terms of the instrument or any federal
191
law, or any provision of a specific instrument violates a TERA.
Nonetheless, ITEDSA specifies that “the United States shall not be liable
to any party (including any Indian tribe) for any negotiated term of, or
any loss resulting from the negotiated terms of” any instrument executed
192
pursuant to an approved TERA.
In hearings prior to passage of the statute, tribal representatives
argued that ITEDSA absolves the federal government of its trust
responsibilities for energy resources without removing ultimate federal
193
control over resource development. The Navajo Nation, which had just
received an adverse decision from the U.S. Supreme Court regarding
194
federal liability for the loss of some $600 million in coal royalties, was
particularly vehement. The Nation favored “streamlining” the resource
development process as a way of promoting “efficiency, accountability,
195
However, it did not believe that ITEDSA
and self-determination.”
promoted true tribal decision-making:
While these bills purport to put tribes in the driver[‘s] seat of
decision making, they continue to empower the federal
government to act as the traffic cop who is authorized to put its
hand out to stop a tribe’s car from moving. Both bills ultimately
preserve the federal government’s final authority over energy
leases. Such final authority constitutes the lead role. This scheme,
wherein a cabinet Secretary has prescriptive control over decisions
regarding Indian energy development, but no subsequent liability,
is an abdication of the federal trust responsibility that is patently
unfair to tribes. 196
The concerns reflected in this statement are multiple. Tribes are
concerned that all the costs of energy development are being shifted
onto them without sufficient resources to meet those costs. Tribes will
absorb the costs—both direct and indirect—of preparing TERAs,
negotiating leases, agreements, and rights-of-way, conducting
environmental reviews, and responding to challenges by “interested
189

25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(A).
Id. § 3504(e)(6)(B).
191
Id. § 3504(e)(6)(C).
192
Id. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii).
193
ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 101 (testimony of the Navajo Nation); see id.
at 107 (supplemental statement of Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation); see id. at
118 (statement of Vernon Hill, Chairman, Eastern Shoshone Business Council of the
Wind River Indian Reservation).
194
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 500, 514 (2003).
195
ITEDSA Hearing, supra note 2, at 104 (supplemental statement of Joe Shirley,
Jr., President, Navajo Nation).
196
Id. at 107.
190
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parties.” Grant funds will be available to offset some of the costs, and the
Department of the Interior is instructed to assist with advice and
expertise to the extent that it can. But inevitably tribes will bear
substantial costs.
Tribes will also bear substantial liabilities in the event that things go
awry. If a tribe does not have adequate resources to provide information
and expertise in negotiations, and sufficient federal assistance is not
forthcoming, the federal government bears no responsibility. If the
Secretary provides information to the energy companies, but not the
tribes, the federal government bears no responsibility.
To a great extent, the trust provisions of ITEDSA mirror those of the
1982 Indian Mineral Development Act. Under the IMDA, the Secretary is
197
directed to act “in the best interest of the Indian tribe.” Nothing in the
statute “shall absolve the United States from any responsibility to Indians”
arising from the trust doctrine, and the Secretary is obligated to protect
198
tribal rights in case of a violation of any minerals agreement. The
Secretary is also obligated to provide “advice, assistance, and
information” to tribes during negotiations “to the extent of his [sic]
199
But as with ITEDSA, the IMDA specifically
available resources.”
provides that “the United States shall not be liable for losses sustained by
200
a tribe” under a minerals agreement. The absence of trust litigation
under the IMDA may indicate that the statutory structure of the trust
201
responsibility functions reasonably well.
There is, however, one significant difference between the IMDA and
ITEDSA: under the IMDA, the Secretary approves or disapproves each
specific agreement for mineral development. In making that
determination, the Secretary is bound not only by the vague “best
interest of the Indian tribe” standard, but is instructed to consider such
factors as potential economic return, financial effects on the tribe,
marketability of the minerals, and environmental, social, and cultural
202
effects on the tribe. Thus, while the Secretary is not a guarantor against
tribal financial losses, the Secretary’s failure to consider or adequately
account for specified factors might subject the government to damages
for breach of trust.
No such potential fall-back exists with ITEDSA. Once a TERA is
approved, tribes make the unilateral decisions whether to enter into a
specific development instrument and how each specific instrument
should be structured. The Secretary retains the obligation to protect
197

25 U.S.C. § 2103(b) (2000).
Id. § 2103(e).
199
Id. § 2106.
200
Id. § 2103(e).
201
As noted earlier, there has been only one reported case litigated under the
IMDA, and it did not involve an allegation of breach of trust. See Quantum
Exploration, Inc. v. Clark, 780 F.2d 1457 (9th Cir. 1986).
202
25 U.S.C. § 2103(b); 25 C.F.R. § 225.3.
198
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tribes against violations of specific instruments by other parties, but
otherwise is free of responsibility.
Nonetheless, I am not convinced it is going to be a problem. What
203
made the Navajo coal lease case such a betrayal was that there was
nothing the Navajo Nation could have done to see it coming or to head it
off. The leases were issued under the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act.
Despite the Supreme Court’s protestations to the contrary, the federal
government controlled IMLA leases, subject only to tribal consent. Tribes
relied on the Secretary’s expertise and obligations, in part because they
had no choice if they wished to develop their resources. The coal lease at
issue called for adjustment of the royalty rate after twenty years, and the
Navajo Nation negotiated without knowing that the Secretary of the
Interior was undermining its efforts by providing crucial information
204
only to the coal company. The Navajo Nation acted in good faith
reliance on the government’s trusteeship, and the government betrayed
that trust. Then, to make matters worse, the Supreme Court held that the
government did not violate any specific statutory or regulatory duty
under the IMLA, and was therefore not liable in damages under that
statute. The outrage of that decision is palpable in comments on the bills
that became ITEDSA.
But that level of tribal trust in the government may, and should be, a
thing of the past. Even if Secretary Hodel’s actions in the Navajo coal
case were not in violation of the IMLA or its regulations, simple ethics
should prevent a repeat of the situation. And even if they don’t, the clear
lesson of the Navajo case for tribes is that over-reliance on the good faith
of the government can be a dangerous thing. Tribes need, as a practical
205
matter if nothing else, to look out for their own interests.
And the modern statutes—ITEDSA as well as the IMDA—make that
clear. Unlike the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, which encouraged tribal
dependence on government decision-making, the modern statutes set
forth a clear bargain. Tribes can take advantage of new options and
increased practical sovereignty, but in exchange the government has a
203

Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 488, discussed supra at text accompanying notes
116–19.
204
In fact, the lease authorized the Secretary to readjust the royalties to a
“reasonable” rate after twenty years. The Navajo Nation initiated proceedings several
years before the adjustment provision would take effect, and the department’s initial
decision was to raise the royalties from the “extremely low” rate of thirty-seven and
one-half cents per ton to twenty percent. The coal company appealed, and the
Secretary then directed that any decision on the appeal be deferred so that the coal
company and the Navajo Nation could negotiate an adjusted royalty rate. Navajo
Nation v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 221 (2000). Those negotiations, based in
part on the Secretary’s ex parte communications with the coal company, resulted in a
royalty rate of twelve and one-half percent, the federal minimum, which the Secretary
then approved. Id.
205
Said with full understanding that many tribes simply don’t have the resources
to be able to do so.
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deeply discounted trust responsibility. Tribes can opt in to this system or
not, at their discretion. The overt nature of the statutory deal, along with
the stark reminder of the Navajo case, should mean that tribes are
sufficiently on notice if they choose the TERA route offered by ITEDSA.
Whether the trade-off is worthwhile is a decision for each tribe to make
for itself.
V. CONCLUSION

Mineral development in Indian country is embarking on an exciting
new phase. ITEDSA offers tribes a new approach, one where tribes
themselves make the ultimate decisions about specific development
activities. Like any new approach, however, ITEDSA is fraught with
potential snags and problems. It still requires federal approval of tribal
regulations for mineral development. It is too limited in the minerals it
covers, does not adequately address tribal financial and technical
concerns, mandates considerable public input into tribal decisionmaking, and limits the federal government’s trust responsibilities. The
TERA approach under ITEDSA is not the best approach for all mineralowning tribes, but it will be the best approach for some. For those tribes
with the willingness, as well as the technical and financial capabilities, to
take advantage of ITEDSA, the statute provides a major step toward true
tribal self-determination over resource development.

